Tag Archives: human rights

The Pause At Oak Flat and the Politics of the Energy Transition

Here’s the letter Joan Pepin, US Forest Service attorney, sent to the Clerk of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit yesterday afternoon. Reuters has the full story, with comment from Rio Tinto, the San Carlos Apache, and the Mayor of Superior, Arizona, who fears investors will be scared away because “the federal government can’t make up its mind.”

I thought I should have a look at the actual Pepin letter and share it, along with the parts of the argument video to which her letter refers — two exchanges dealing with representations made by the US government in Apache Stronghold v. USA. I allowed a little extra discussion in the second clip because it provides important context.


The Biden administration is sure to take some flack over this latest delay, especially because Resolution Copper is “hoping to supply more than a quarter of U.S. copper demand for the energy transition.” Republicans will cry hypocrisy. But the case could also reflect poorly on the Trump administration, which appears not to have taken its formal consultation responsibilities seriously.

In November 2020, just after the election and before her nomination as Secretary of the Interior, Deb Halaand said the Trump administration had “tossed tribal consultation out the window.” A 2020 Harvard Law school report found that “a lack of foundational recognition of tribal sovereignty and the importance of nation to-nation relationships” during the Trump administration had “[undermined] consultation and collaborative efforts.” Upon taking office, Biden set out to repair the damage done by his predecessor, issuing an executive order that reaffirmed the government-to-government relationship and reinstated the consultation mandate.

At a prayer vigil outside the White House last month, San Carlos Apache Tribal Vice Chairman Tao Etpison said “no meaningful consultation has occurred with tribes.” And yet, he added, “the administration is moving forward to give the copper to the Chinese” because that is the most likely place the ore would go for processing.

These are, by now, all familiar political themes of the energy transition: the need for meaningful consultation (and consent), conflicts over land and water use, complaints of administrative delay (and calls for permitting reform), China’s strategic advantage and outsize influence. How we address these issues will determine the kind of transition we ultimately get.

Enbridge and Indigenous Rights at Citigroup’s Shareholder Meeting

One of the many signs outside Citigroup headquarters during last week’s shareholder meeting.

A proposal brought by several religious orders at last week’s Citigroup annual shareholder meeting asked the company to report on its policies and practices “in respecting internationally-recognized human rights standards for Indigenous Peoples’ rights.” The proposal (page 125) specifically called out Citigroup’s financing of oil and gas operations in the Amazon, which “pose an ‘existential threat’ to Indigenous Peoples” in the region, and it applied equally strong language to the bank’s $5 billion-plus in financing to pipeline company Enbridge:

Indigenous leaders from the Great lakes tribes have called Enbridge’s line 5 pipeline reroute “an act of cultural genocide.” A 2022 ruling found that line 5 was operating illegally on Bad River Band territory since 2013. Michigan Governor Whitmer canceled Enbridge’s certification in 2020, citing “Enbridge’s historic failures and current noncompliance” as jeopardizing the safety of Michigan residents and the environment. Michigan’s twelve federally recognized Tribal Nations requested President Biden to decommission line 5 in 2021, and the pipeline faces ongoing litigation from numerous plaintiffs. The severity of Indigenous opposition is reflected by the Bay Mills Indian Community formally banishing the pipeline from its reservation, noting Enbridge’s deceptive tactics, poor environmental track record, and risk of “catastrophic damage” to Indigenous rights. Companies like Enbridge, financed by Citigroup, consistently fail to meet the international standard of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) with affected tribes.

Here’s audio of the brief discussion of that proposal at the shareholder meeting. Listen closely to Tara Houska present the case for the proposal. What follows is disappointing but no less revealing. Citigroup Chair John C. Dugan tells shareholders the board recommends voting against the proposal; then, after a question about why Citigroup misled shareholders about its financing of Enbridge Lines 3 and 5, Dugan effectively closes the discussion with evasive boilerplate. The board retreats to lawyered statements and specious claims like the one about Enbridge’s “industry-leading engagement policies.” Still, 31.6 percent of Citigroup’s shareholders voted for the proposal — an impressive showing.

P.S. An earlier version of this audio file was not showing up on phones — something to do with the way WordPress converted it, or failed to convert it. Sorry about that. It should work now.

Anti-ESG Activists Come To Intel

A shareholder proposal asking Intel to square its business in China with its ESG commitments looks like a Trojan horse.

The proposal (Proposal 7, p. 130) argues that “Intel’s environmental promises and human rights commitments are belied by its cozy relationship with China, a country that is controlled by the dictatorial and inhumane Chinese Communist Party.”

Doing business with China, which is the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world and which commits genocide against ethnic minorities – [sic] runs counter to everything that Intel claims to stand for. It is therefore critical that the Board commission and publish a third party review that includes experts who are fully aware of the dangers that China poses to ensure that Intel’s actions as a company live up to its words.

It’s brought by the Free Enterprise Project at the National Center for Public Policy Research, a conservative organization that has been around since the Reagan era, with longstanding ties to the American Legislative Council (ALEC) and the State Policy Network. The Center also counts among its allies the National Legal and Policy Center (NLPC), which last year scored a small victory at 3M when one of its proposals on China and human rights garnered an impressive 12 percent support. Intel is a new target for these groups, who claim to be outraged by the company’s about-face apology on Xinjiang in 2021 as well as its sponsorship of the 2022 Olympics.

These days, the Free Enterprise Project is (predictably enough) all about “Woke Capitalism,” a product of “the Left’s Radical ESG Agenda” that will result in “the leftist capture of American corporations.” Or, as they put it in their 2022 Investor Value Voter Guide, “the ESG boosters, both in and out of C-suites, want to make our lives poorer, less reliable and less safe, while enriching the enemies of the West, for no possible good outcome except their own self-aggrandizement.” This is the reasoning behind their opposition to everything from DEI to decarbonization.

This year’s Proxy Preview from As You Sow includes an entire section dedicated to bad faith proposals that sound an awful lot like this one and are in reality “anti-ESG.” The Free Enterprise Project and its allies tend to copy

verbatim the resolved clauses of their ideological opponents, or use language in resolved clauses that makes the resolutions appear to support sustainability objectives—although the rest of the proposals cite right-wing opinion pieces and argue against their purported goal.

The objective is to find a point of leverage, call out corporate hypocrisy, and demonstrate that ESG commitments are a costly and destructive diversion of company resources.

When it comes to human rights in China, right wing activists see that this strategy can get results: “this human rights issue – involving both slave labor and genocide of the minority Muslim Uyghur population at the hands of the CCP – animates factions from both the political right and left.” That’s from the Free Enterprise Project Investor Value report, cited above. As You Sow concurs:

The ideas in anti-ESG resolutions have no traction with investors—nor with many companies—and on average earn 4 percent support or less. The sole exception concerns doing business in China, where the left and right agree that China’s authoritarianism is deeply problematic, as is its persecution of the Uyghur people.

That “exception” helps explain the self-righteous, combative tone of the Free Enterprise Project proposal, and the copy-paste approach they and the NLPC have taken for this year’s proxy season:

Proxy Monitor data showing human rights proposals submitted by the National Center for Public Policy Research and the National Legal and Policy Center.

The question before Intel shareholders is what practical effect voting for this proposal might have. The board of directors opposes it, for all the usual reasons, so it is unlikely to pass; but it could garner enough support to qualify for re-submission. That would bring the Free Enterprise Project back again next year.

More importantly, the proposal would require that Intel engage “experts who are fully aware of the dangers that China poses.” Those are not necessarily human rights experts or even China experts, but people who qualify as experts because they are “fully aware” — that is, ideologically aligned on China with the National Center for Public Policy Research. Think Peter Navarro (or worse): that’s who would be engaging with the company, and whose views the company would “publish.” This doesn’t sound like a constructive way to push the company to raise human rights standards (or improve its business performance); it just sets the stage for right wing bluster, fake outrage, and ideological preening.

It is difficult for me to vote against any measure that asks companies to do more in the area of human rights, and I am disappointed by the Intel board’s boilerplate response. They could do so much better. But in this case I am voting with them and against Proposal 7.

Update. The proposal received 4.31 percent support at the 11 May Annual Stockholders’ Meeting, falling short of the 5 percent needed to qualify for re-submission next year. For more on Trojan Horse proposals, see the brief write-up in this 2021 report (page 59) from Glass Lewis, which I had not read before I wrote this post.

The Luna Human Rights Amendment in Context

The amendment Anna Paulina Luna crowed about on Twitter today would appear to give no quarter to bad foreign actors in the mining sector.

A closer look reveals that it’s actually a stripped-down version of a much more robust and far-reaching amendment introduced by Representative Raul Grijalva earlier in the day, which Republicans strenuously opposed. Notably, this narrower version cedes significant ground, giving mining companies a pass on environmental damage and destruction of cultural heritage sites.

Here are a few highlights, just to give the flavor of the discussion.

On The Reliability of Cobalt Red

In my last post, I promised to have more to say about Siddharth Kara’s Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives, and in particular about Kara’s reliability as a narrator. This post tries to make good on that promise and set out some markers for further discussion of an issue that comes up repeatedly throughout Cobalt Red — and in all human rights reporting. Highlighting it can, I hope, offer ways to engage critically with Kara’s work and help others do the same.

“Our daily lives are powered by a human and environmental catastrophe in the Congo.”

In Cobalt Red, Siddharth Kara sets out to confront that catastrophe, and to demonstrate that “the ongoing exploitation of the people of the Congo by the rich and powerful invalidates the purported moral foundation of contemporary civilization and drags us back to a time when the people of Africa were valued only by their replacement cost.” This “moral reversion” to the colonial past, he argues, is “itself a form of violence.”

Kara advances that argument in an unapologetically first-person account. Cobalt Red invites readers at every turn to see the conditions in the Copper Belt of the Congo through Kara’s eyes. The book is informed throughout by Kara’s reading of the history and literature of the Congo and colored by his own imagination. How could it be otherwise? Yet the very qualities that make the writing here so compelling, so readable and moving, are those which make it unsettling and disorienting.

At several points, Kara himself has a hard time getting his bearings or coming up with a satisfactory answer to the question put to him by a Congolese man named Josue: “What are you doing here? What are you doing here?…What good will it do?” (Even the Congolese ambassador to the United States tells Kara he does not think a “foreigner” like Kara should be the one to report the Congolese people’s story.) In his attempts to gain access to mining sites, Kara has to invent different answers to Josue’s question; and these cover stories contribute to the sense of uncertainty throughout the book.

To his credit, Kara doesn’t shy from the problem: he foregrounds and tries to make a narrative virtue of it. As a result, the main impression of the Congo one takes away from Cobalt Red is of a world that is often inaccessible, reluctant or afraid to reveal itself to outsiders, only disclosing its harsh and inconvenient truths in moments of frenzy, violence, death, and human suffering.

It’s a difficult storytelling project. It doesn’t help that Kara’s access to the artisanal miners and the artisanal mine sites themselves is checked at every turn, often with the threat of violence, and everything having to do with cobalt mining in the Congo is murky, “opaque and untraceable by design.”

Inevitably, Kara oversteps, imposing on his encounters or filling in where his interlocutors would prefer to remain silent. One striking instance comes about midway through the book, when Kara meets Nikki, a fifteen-year-old mother with a baby strapped to her back as she digs for cobalt in a trench. She works alongside a fourteen-year-old mother named Chance. They rise at dawn, walk thirty minutes from their village to the artisanal mining area, dig, and wash stones together. In a day, they can fill about one raffia sack with cobalt-bearing heterogenite, which will earn them between one and two dollars. Kara counts “at least two hundred children and several hundred adults” digging in the same trench.

Kara starts to interview the two teenage mothers, but Nikki’s daughter is crying and Chance tells him she can’t talk more because she has to get back to work.

Nikki was having no success at consoling her daughter. She tried to feed her, but the infant did not respond. Her cries turned to shrieks. Was she colicky? Had she soiled herself? How did one care for a baby in circumstances such as these, especially when the mother herself was a child? [Kara’s guide] Arthur motioned to me that we should continue down the trench.

Moments later, Kara and Arthur find themselves surrounded by guards, “red-eyed and stinking of liquor” and firing Kalashnikovs into the air. After some back and forth, and an examination of Kara’s phone and documents, a cool-headed Arthur persuades the militia to let them go.

As we exited the artisanal mining area, I caught a glimpse of Nikki one last time. Her daughter had finally calmed down and was sleeping on her back as she dug in the trench. Nikki stared at me blankly, coldly…then with the slightest tremble in her eyes, her expression changed to that of a terrified child. Our eyes locked in recognition. I think we both understood that she was doomed.

Of course, this may not be the moment of mutual understanding Kara makes it out to be. It reads like a re-telling of the Orpheus and Eurydice story, which would line up with Kara’s depiction of the Congo as “hell on earth,” a “hellscape,” but how much is Kara reading into this moment of “recognition”? What does Nikki’s expression convey? Why the dramatic use of ellipses? How much of this is projection? The last we saw of her, Nikki was tending to her child; Kara didn’t stay with her but followed Arthur down the trench. Nikki might well have drawn other conclusions about Kara’s passing interest in her or his intentions.

Kara makes similar moves elsewhere: at a brothel in Kasulo, Kara sees “a young girl wearing a deep violet dress, with her hair tied in pigtails” who gives off a “childlike radiance”; at a church service in Fungurume, “a child looked at me, his wide eyes alight and comforting.” From this look, Kara “understood at last how the people of the Congo survived their daily torment–they loved God with full and fiery hearts and drew comfort from the promise of salvation.”

At other moments in Cobalt Red, nothing so clear comes of such looks and shared glances. At Tenke Fungurume, “no one smiles,” or at least not in Kara’s presence. At the Shabara mine, after a fight distracts Kara’s official minders, Kara “locked eyes with some of the nearby workers. Some gazed back curiously, others defensively, and some looked right through me as if I were just another chunk of stone in the dirt.” Another teenage mother, fifteen-year-old Elodie, orphaned and forced to turn to prostitution to survive, grows “weary of [Kara’s] presence. I was just another unwelcome burden.”

For Kara, Elodie “was the nullity of the world,” and his meeting with her seems to move him more than any other encounter he has in the Congo. Upon hearing that Elodie has died, he sits beneath a tree to pray and ends up imagining her final moments. He cannot: he can only wonder what she thought and knew and felt, but he ends up imagining Elodie, too, praying “to whichever God might be listening, ‘Please take me home.'”

At times Kara has to leave out important details on purpose, to protect his subjects; at others, it’s unclear why he would. To take just one example: a distraught mother living near the Tenke Fungurume mine asks Kara for help for her child Makano, who was badly injured in a mining accident and is now dying. After agonizing over the risks of giving a source money, Kara admits: “I did what I could to assist Makano as discreetly as possible.” What, exactly, did he do?

The uncertainties that attend so many of the encounters in Cobalt Red are compounded by the fact that most of Kara’s interviews are conducted with the help of “numerous guides and translators” like Arthur, Oliver, and Augustin. How much gets lost in translation is impossible to say. At one point, Kara meets a girl named Aimee, who looks to be about eight or nine, rinsing and stacking stones.

I started to speak with her about her work as a group of women gathered around in a protective formation. I had just about managed to learn that Aimee’s parents were dead and that she lived with an aunt in Kanina when she suddenly began to scream at the top of her lungs. The women shouted angrily at me and moved to console the child. The commotion escalated, and the…soldiers rushed over. My translator tried to calm the situation, but Aimee would not stop screaming. I did not understand what I had done to upset her.

He leaves Lake Golf “amid a storm of protest” that he himself caused. Just a few moments earlier, he has been hearing from other workers about “the men” who buy the heterogenite at Lake Golf, but given “all the talking, shouting, and sloshing going on,” he can’t follow up.

His account of a meeting in Tenke seems to involve a similar lapse of understanding: a man named Kafufu tells Kara he has “something urgent” to show him — a village carpeted in sulfuric acid powder — but it is never clear in Kara’s telling why Kafufu is so insistent that it cannot wait. At yet another moment, Kara’s translator Augustin is “distraught after several days of trying to find the words in English that captured the grief being described in Swahili. He would at time drop his head and sob before attempting to translate what was said.”

There are no ready solutions to the brutalities Kara witnesses in the cobalt mines of the Congo, and there are no easy ways to ensure the reliability and truthfulness of what he, or any human rights researcher, witnesses. Kara seems painfully aware of his own project’s limitations, and he embraces the difficulties of translating the suffering of the Congolese people for readers in the rich world.

In an epilogue, he sets out what he considers a “first step” in surmounting these problems: “advancing the ability of the Congolese people to conduct their own research and safely speak for themselves.” We can believe him when he says that “voices on the ground tell a different, if not antithetical, story to the one told at the top.” Ultimately, we at the top have much more to fear from the truth than those at the bottom.

Kara on Mutoshi: A Note on Cobalt Red

Siddharth Kara’s Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives offers another view of the Mutoshi artisanal mining pilot site discussed in Dorothée Baumann-Pauly’s recent white paper. Kara draws many of the same broad conclusions as Baumann-Pauly:

There were several improvements at the Mutoshi mine compared to other artisanal mining sites in the [Democratic Republic of Congo], especially for female workers. Women endured constant harassment and sexual assault at most of the sites I documented. They received pitiful wages for their work and were still expected to run their households and manage children. Even if they were earning anemic wages at [Mutoshi], the reduction in sexual assault was a considerable improvement in their lives. Supplying clean water, toilets, and at least some protective gear also helped mitigate illness and toxic exposure. The mine was not crawling with children or visibly pregnant women. There also did not appear to be any sort of tunnel digging, which prevented the worst tragedies from occurring.

Other parts of Kara’s discussion are hard to reconcile with this picture. Kara has been led to expect that pilot sites like Mutoshi provide “ironclad assurances” that cobalt supply chains are “untainted by child labor or other abuses.” He is disappointed (but not surprised) when he discovers lax oversight and neglect:

Based on everything I saw and heard during my tour of the Mutoshi mine, as well as my subsequent interviews with artisanal miners who worked at the site, the conditions at the…model site did not match what I had been told by some of the [Washington, DC-based NGO] Pact staff in Kolwezi. Specifically, there appeared to be child-mined cobalt entering Mutoshi through the spaghetti-wire fence. Teenagers worked at the site with fake voter registration cards. The radiation officer was not regularly checking radiation levels. Bags of cobalt were not tagged, and cobalt from unknown origins was purchased from external depots and mixed at [a] refining facility in Lubumbashi. Crucially, reduced or delayed wage payments appeared to be a major disincentive for many artisanal miners and was compromising the viability of the entire operation. The purported supply chain transparency and traceability turned out to be a fiction.

For Kara, this fiction is part of ”a shrewd scheme of obfuscation adorned with hypocritical proclamations about the preservation of human rights”; and it is “the latest in a long history of ‘enormous and atrocious’ lies that have tormented the people of the Congo.”

Kara is quoting Joseph Conrad there, and Heart of Darkness is one of the texts to which he returns throughout the book: “spend a short time watching the filth-caked children of the Katanga region scrounge at the earth for cobalt, and you would be unable to determine whether they were working for the benefit of [King] Leopold [II of Belgium] or a tech company.” His emulation of writers like Conrad and Morel, his eagerness to draw historical parallels, and his tendency to dramatize some of his encounters in the Congo all make Cobalt Red both powerful and unsettling – and not least because this kind of writing raises some questions about the narrator’s reliability.

That observation does not discredit or diminish the importance of the account of artisanal mining in Cobalt Red. To the contrary: it’s a place to start engaging with the book and the inherent difficulties of Kara’s project. I’m still grappling with it, and taking some notes to illustrate the point, so I am not going to address it right now.

For the moment, and by way of wrapping up the discussion of Mutoshi, I’ll point out that Kara fails to mention that the Mutoshi pilot was shut down “just a few months” after his September 2019 visit in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (as Baumann-Pauly notes). Kara attributes its closure instead to a failure of “will,” which he casts as a betrayal: the withdrawal of CHEMAF or Chemicals of Africa from the pilot program. I hope to have more to say about all this at some point soon.

Holding Up Political Props Will Not Uphold Human Rights


When American politicians like Bruce Westerman talk about mining cobalt in the United States, they are almost always talking about copper and nickel mining. According to the US Geological Survey, the US has only 4 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves; and with the notable exception of the Jervois cobalt mine in Idaho and some unexploited reserves in Missouri, “any future cobalt production” would be a “byproduct” of copper and nickel mining.

Most of that mining would be done in the Lake Superior region. In Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, Lundin’s Eagle Mine has produced cobalt-bearing nickel concentrate. Rio Tinto-Talon Metals already control copper and nickel development from Ishpeming to the Keweenaw. In addition to this massive 400,000 acre land package in Michigan, the joint venture also controls the 31,000 acre Tamarack project in Minnesota, the state where most US cobalt reserves are located.

Even here, the primary target resource is nickel, followed by copper, as Tamarack’s own estimates clearly show. In 2017, Antofagasta briefly floated the idea in its annual report that its Twin Metals project near the Boundary Waters would be a significant source of cobalt, but this looks like nothing more than an attempt to position the mine as a source of critical minerals, and the company abandoned that posture. (Trump’s Department of Interior toyed with the idea, too.)

In light of these basic facts, Westerman’s arguments look specious and his moral posture deeply cynical. It’s concerning to see the Chair of the House Committee on Natural Resources use the artisanal, small-scale miners of the Congo as a political prop – I use that word advisedly – and trade on serious human rights concerns without any plan to address them. Amnesty International’s Mark Dummet fears this kind of “wholly self-serving” virtue signaling could even harm the people it pretends to protect.

Westerman seems to be taking his cues from Minnesota Republican Pete Stauber, who made the same argument after the Biden administration announced the 20-year mineral withdrawal to protect the Boundary Waters:

Joe Biden banned mining in over 225,000 acres of Minnesota’s Iron Range, and locked up development of taconite, copper, nickel, cobalt, platinum group elements, and more…not even one month ago, Joe Biden signed an agreement [presumably the Minerals Security Partnership] to fund mining projects in Chinese-owned mines in the Congo, where over 40,000 children work as slaves in forced labor and inhumane conditions with no environmental protections.

Stauber has made similar shows of concern about human rights in the Congo in the past. This time, just a couple of days later, the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal repeated the talking point: “The reality is that if minerals aren’t mined in the U.S., they will be extracted in countries with far less stringent environmental and labor standards.”

A small correction: the reality is that even if minerals are mined in the United States, they will be extracted in countries with far less stringent environmental and labor standards.**

The focus instead should be on taking steps to raise those standards, as Dorothée Baumann Pauly of the Geneva Center for Business Human Rights argues in a new white paper. Trying to eschew artisanally-mined cobalt from the DRC is tantamount to “denial of market realities,”* she writes:

global companies buying cobalt need to encourage the formalization and responsible extraction of the mineral rather than engaging in a futile attempt to avoid cobalt associated with ASM [artisanal small-scale mining] — an attempt that also ignores the sustenance that artisanal mining provides to millions of poor people.

In the Mutoshi pilot formalization program studied by Baumann-Pauly, mechanically prepared (open pit) small-scale mines improved safety. “Formalization stopped children and pregnant women from coming to the mine site.” Other measures encouraged women to participate in mining. The pay these women miners earned could double household income, and in interviews they said the extra income helped offset educational expenses for their children, who were now in school instead of working at a mine site. (Though the pilot program ended during the Covid-19 pandemic, a local cooperative continues to try to enforce these new standards at Mutoshi.)

None of this amounts to a perfect solution, but there’s clearly an opportunity to build on what this pilot accomplished, and it’s encouraging that Microsoft’s Michele Burlington, who accompanied Baumann-Pauly on her trip to the Congo, called for a “coalition” to address ASM in the cobalt supply chain.

If Republicans (or Democrats, for that matter) want to address human rights abuses in the DRC, then they should focus on taking constructive steps. And if they are really concerned about China’s outsize influence in the mineral supply chain, then they might want to take a closer look at China’s ownership stakes in companies like Rio Tinto, the very companies that promise to bring jobs and economic development to their own districts.

*This chart from The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) nicely illustrates the point.

** A briefing from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre also warns against the complacency behind these arguments: “assumptions [that] localisation of supply of transition minerals and their production in Europe and North America will guarantee respect for human rights and a sustainable, ethical provision of these materials are misguided.”

Permitting Reform? How About a Better Business Model?

From Phil Bloomer’s case for “tempered optimism” on business and human rights in the new year:

…2022 saw human rights gains in some key sectors, even as there remains room for considerable improvement. In 2023 our movement has a critical opportunity to hold together on climate change and the urgent energy transition. We all recognise that rapid shutdown of fossil fuels is an existential challenge, but divisions arise on how to achieve speed. Some activists advocate the inclusion of human rights ‘as long as it does not slow the transition’. But growing evidence shows we will only achieve a fast transition if it respects human rights and delivers real benefits to communities and workers. More responsible renewable energy companies are moving to adopt this effective business model by including shared ownership to build the stake of communities and workers in these projects. More troubling is the transition minerals sector, on which new renewable installations depend, where even the more responsible mining companies appear committed to ‘business as usual’ models – and that’s despite expensive permit suspensions and community protests against abuses.

Will the 118th Congress See A Green Right Coalition?

Yesterday’s post about Nancy Pelosi’s remarks on China belongs to one strand of a larger story that’s coming into focus.  It’s a story about China and human rights, to be sure, but also about what role human rights issues will play in the transition to renewables and in the politics of the transition.

House Republicans on the Natural Resources Committee have already cited reports of human rights abuses in China and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (where Chinese companies control cobalt mining operations) as an argument for boosting extraction of critical minerals here in the US. As the gavel passes in the coming year, their position is likely to attract even more support.

In fact, the 118th Congress could see the emergence of a Green Right coalition: hawkish on China, touting the magic of markets, openly hostile to the administrative state, and more interested in achieving energy dominance (to borrow a phrase from the Trump years) than in paying lip service to a just transition (as some Democrats do).  The incoming Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, plans to “outcompete China on climate:” that phrase sums up a whole political and geopolitical agenda. 

The program could be a political winner: anti-China, pro-growth, industry-captured climate policy may accelerate organized labor’s rightward drift; and the Green Right may even enjoy an uneasy honeymoon period with more left-leaning advocates of permitting reform.

Over the past year or so, as Joe Manchin tried but failed to advance his permitting deal, reformers have shown themselves ready to take an axe to environmental law, they have regularly dismissed public opposition as NIMBY whining, and some of them have done more public advocacy for extractive industry than seasoned lobbyists and flacks could ever dream of doing. 

Pelosi on the Moral Authority to Talk about Human Rights in China, or Anyplace

Asked this morning about Republican plans to create a Select Committee on China in the coming year, Speaker Nancy Pelosi noted that there is already a bipartisan, bi-cameral committee on China and made this “statement” about human rights.

Corporate America has [been] largely responsible for the situation we’re in, in terms of the trade deficit and the rest…but from a standpoint of values, from the standpoint of economy, and from the standpoint of security, China poses a challenge to us….We want to work together on climate issues and the rest, but, but we cannot have our workers disadvantaged by China having prison labor manufacture products or contribute to the manufacture of products that just provide unfair competition for us….My statement is that if we refuse to talk about human rights in China because of economic issues, we lose all moral authority to talk about human rights anyplace in the world.

Predictably enough, the press conference moved on quickly from there. A follow-up question on legislation to ban TikTok failed to elicit anything more on US economic interests and human rights in China. Here’s video of the moment: