Tag Archives: energy transition

The Pause At Oak Flat and the Politics of the Energy Transition

Here’s the letter Joan Pepin, US Forest Service attorney, sent to the Clerk of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit yesterday afternoon. Reuters has the full story, with comment from Rio Tinto, the San Carlos Apache, and the Mayor of Superior, Arizona, who fears investors will be scared away because “the federal government can’t make up its mind.”

I thought I should have a look at the actual Pepin letter and share it, along with the parts of the argument video to which her letter refers — two exchanges dealing with representations made by the US government in Apache Stronghold v. USA. I allowed a little extra discussion in the second clip because it provides important context.


The Biden administration is sure to take some flack over this latest delay, especially because Resolution Copper is “hoping to supply more than a quarter of U.S. copper demand for the energy transition.” Republicans will cry hypocrisy. But the case could also reflect poorly on the Trump administration, which appears not to have taken its formal consultation responsibilities seriously.

In November 2020, just after the election and before her nomination as Secretary of the Interior, Deb Halaand said the Trump administration had “tossed tribal consultation out the window.” A 2020 Harvard Law school report found that “a lack of foundational recognition of tribal sovereignty and the importance of nation to-nation relationships” during the Trump administration had “[undermined] consultation and collaborative efforts.” Upon taking office, Biden set out to repair the damage done by his predecessor, issuing an executive order that reaffirmed the government-to-government relationship and reinstated the consultation mandate.

At a prayer vigil outside the White House last month, San Carlos Apache Tribal Vice Chairman Tao Etpison said “no meaningful consultation has occurred with tribes.” And yet, he added, “the administration is moving forward to give the copper to the Chinese” because that is the most likely place the ore would go for processing.

These are, by now, all familiar political themes of the energy transition: the need for meaningful consultation (and consent), conflicts over land and water use, complaints of administrative delay (and calls for permitting reform), China’s strategic advantage and outsize influence. How we address these issues will determine the kind of transition we ultimately get.

A Shift in Strategy for Antofagasta’s Twin Metals Project

Chart from opensecrets.org

I usually post the quarterly lobbying disclosures for Antofagasta’s Twin Metals project on Twitter, but I am taking a social media break. So here’s a quick post about what this quarter’s disclosures show.

Q1 2023 disclosures reflect a change in strategy after the actions taken last year by the Solicitor of the Interior, the Bureau of Land Management, and the US Forest Service. Lobbying of the executive branch has shifted to the Department of Energy. The focus of the lobbying is now around the energy transition, positioning Twin Metals as “a world-class project to provide the critical metals that a growing and greener world requires.” (That’s from the latest Antofagasta annual report).

It also looks as if the company is off to a slightly more modest start this year, committing a total of $180,000 for the first quarter of 2023. (In 2022, as I noted back in January, Antofagasta spent over 1 million dollars lobbying the US federal government for its project near the Boundary Waters — $1010,000, to be precise. First quarter expenditures were $200,000; second quarter, $290K; Q3, $280K; and Q4, $240K).

Let’s break down that Q1 2023 number.

  • The Daschle Group, the only group that lobbies directly for the Chilean mining company (and not for its Twin Metals US subsidiary), reports $20,000. This is just a retainer: for this quarter, as in the first and fourth quarters of last year, they report no lobbying activity.
  • Brownstein Hyatt continues to command the lion’s share of the Twin Metals lobbying dollars, and with good reason. Former Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt rejoined Brownstein Hyatt after the Trump administration came to its ignominious end; and in 2021 the firm poached Wilmer Hale’s Andrew Spielman, who during the Trump years helped shepherd the Twin Metals project through the agency Bernhardt led. Last year, Brownstein pulled in $490,000 for Twin Metals lobbying; $120,000 of that was billed in Q1 of 2022. In the first quarter of 2023, Brownstein Hyatt reports just a little less for its Twin Metals work: $110,000. The firm lobbied the Senate, the House, and the Department of Energy for “supporting development of mining a project in Minnesota” [sic].
  • Wilmer Hale may no longer lead the Twin Metals lobbying efforts, but the firm still reports $50,000 for the first quarter of 2023. They  lobbied the Senate and the House on “mining issues.”

Antofagasta’s three lobbying firms may have to take a slight haircut this year, if this first quarter sets the pattern; but things could pick up again, especially if Antofagasta can get a favorable judgment in federal court. Currently, the project faces some enormous administrative and legal hurdles, enough to trigger a $177.6M impairment in Antofagasta’s accounting. But the Group, as Antofagasta likes to refer to itself, appears to be taking the long view. Administrations come and go, priorities shift, rules change, and Antofagasta needs to keep its American friends close.

A Piece of Legislative Mischief

Something else worth noting happens toward the end of this video clip, when Stauber tries to plant a green flag. “If you are at all serious about emissions reductions, you will vote to support H.R. 1. We need to pass H.R. 1 for energy independence and critical mineral dominance.”

There has already been plenty of commentary around the misleading claim that this bill would reduce emissions. Common Dreams published a pretty good rundown. Opponents have labeled H.R. 1 the Polluters Over People Act; the Center for Western Priorities notes that it would reverse many of the Inflation Reduction Act’s reforms to the onshore oil and gas leasing program; and as for the notion that this bill is “serious” about the energy transition, Chuck Schumer called that “laughable,” and declared this “wishlist for big oil” Dead On Arrival in the Senate.

Equally specious is the Trumpian claim that this legislation is a formula for “critical mineral dominance.” This US Geological Survey presentation on global distribution of critical minerals or these maps from The Wilson Center suggest just how infeasible that is. Misleading claims and rhetorical swagger on this score can lead to bad policy at home and serious missteps abroad.

Take a closer look and it’s clear that this is an act of legislative mischief. The stated legislative purpose of H.R. 1 is to “lower energy costs by increasing American energy production, exports, infrastructure, and critical minerals processing”; but when it comes to critical minerals the bill does nothing of the sort. In fact, the piece of H.R. 1 Stauber wrote (the not-so-subtly entitled  Permitting for Mining Needs Act, or Permit-MN) would do nothing to help secure “critical minerals dominance.” Instead it would effectively do away with critical minerals.

Permit-MN goes through 30 U.S. Code § 1607, the “Critical Minerals Supply Chain and Reliability” section of the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and at every opportunity strikes the word “critical” from the books. It changes the title of the section to “Minerals Supply Chain and Reliability.” It removes the word “critical” from “each place such term appears” in the Sense of Congress section. That section currently reads:

It is the sense of Congress that-
(1) critical minerals are fundamental to the economy, competitiveness, and security of the United States;
(2) many critical minerals are only economic to recover when combined with the production of a host mineral;
(3) to the maximum extent practicable, the critical mineral needs of the United States should be satisfied by minerals responsibly produced and recycled in the United States; and
(4) the Federal permitting process has been identified as an impediment to mineral production and the mineral security of the United States. [emphasis mine.]

Sense becomes nonsense. And Permit-MN makes the same move in subsequent sections, striking the word “critical” wherever it appears. In other words, H.R. 1 would extend the special legislative consideration given to critical minerals, because they are “fundamental to the economy, competitiveness, and security of the United States,” to any and every mining project.

Permit-MN has already won Stauber some favorable local press but it only makes a mockery of serious concerns about national security and the energy transition. What really counts here is not the public interest, or making responsible industrial policy to meet the country’s critical mineral needs, but the immediate financial interests of mining companies. And if this is an indication of the reckless permitting reform we can expect from this Congress, then we are better off leaving things as they are.

The Luna Human Rights Amendment in Context

The amendment Anna Paulina Luna crowed about on Twitter today would appear to give no quarter to bad foreign actors in the mining sector.

A closer look reveals that it’s actually a stripped-down version of a much more robust and far-reaching amendment introduced by Representative Raul Grijalva earlier in the day, which Republicans strenuously opposed. Notably, this narrower version cedes significant ground, giving mining companies a pass on environmental damage and destruction of cultural heritage sites.

Here are a few highlights, just to give the flavor of the discussion.

On The Reliability of Cobalt Red

In my last post, I promised to have more to say about Siddharth Kara’s Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives, and in particular about Kara’s reliability as a narrator. This post tries to make good on that promise and set out some markers for further discussion of an issue that comes up repeatedly throughout Cobalt Red — and in all human rights reporting. Highlighting it can, I hope, offer ways to engage critically with Kara’s work and help others do the same.

“Our daily lives are powered by a human and environmental catastrophe in the Congo.”

In Cobalt Red, Siddharth Kara sets out to confront that catastrophe, and to demonstrate that “the ongoing exploitation of the people of the Congo by the rich and powerful invalidates the purported moral foundation of contemporary civilization and drags us back to a time when the people of Africa were valued only by their replacement cost.” This “moral reversion” to the colonial past, he argues, is “itself a form of violence.”

Kara advances that argument in an unapologetically first-person account. Cobalt Red invites readers at every turn to see the conditions in the Copper Belt of the Congo through Kara’s eyes. The book is informed throughout by Kara’s reading of the history and literature of the Congo and colored by his own imagination. How could it be otherwise? Yet the very qualities that make the writing here so compelling, so readable and moving, are those which make it unsettling and disorienting.

At several points, Kara himself has a hard time getting his bearings or coming up with a satisfactory answer to the question put to him by a Congolese man named Josue: “What are you doing here? What are you doing here?…What good will it do?” (Even the Congolese ambassador to the United States tells Kara he does not think a “foreigner” like Kara should be the one to report the Congolese people’s story.) In his attempts to gain access to mining sites, Kara has to invent different answers to Josue’s question; and these cover stories contribute to the sense of uncertainty throughout the book.

To his credit, Kara doesn’t shy from the problem: he foregrounds and tries to make a narrative virtue of it. As a result, the main impression of the Congo one takes away from Cobalt Red is of a world that is often inaccessible, reluctant or afraid to reveal itself to outsiders, only disclosing its harsh and inconvenient truths in moments of frenzy, violence, death, and human suffering.

It’s a difficult storytelling project. It doesn’t help that Kara’s access to the artisanal miners and the artisanal mine sites themselves is checked at every turn, often with the threat of violence, and everything having to do with cobalt mining in the Congo is murky, “opaque and untraceable by design.”

Inevitably, Kara oversteps, imposing on his encounters or filling in where his interlocutors would prefer to remain silent. One striking instance comes about midway through the book, when Kara meets Nikki, a fifteen-year-old mother with a baby strapped to her back as she digs for cobalt in a trench. She works alongside a fourteen-year-old mother named Chance. They rise at dawn, walk thirty minutes from their village to the artisanal mining area, dig, and wash stones together. In a day, they can fill about one raffia sack with cobalt-bearing heterogenite, which will earn them between one and two dollars. Kara counts “at least two hundred children and several hundred adults” digging in the same trench.

Kara starts to interview the two teenage mothers, but Nikki’s daughter is crying and Chance tells him she can’t talk more because she has to get back to work.

Nikki was having no success at consoling her daughter. She tried to feed her, but the infant did not respond. Her cries turned to shrieks. Was she colicky? Had she soiled herself? How did one care for a baby in circumstances such as these, especially when the mother herself was a child? [Kara’s guide] Arthur motioned to me that we should continue down the trench.

Moments later, Kara and Arthur find themselves surrounded by guards, “red-eyed and stinking of liquor” and firing Kalashnikovs into the air. After some back and forth, and an examination of Kara’s phone and documents, a cool-headed Arthur persuades the militia to let them go.

As we exited the artisanal mining area, I caught a glimpse of Nikki one last time. Her daughter had finally calmed down and was sleeping on her back as she dug in the trench. Nikki stared at me blankly, coldly…then with the slightest tremble in her eyes, her expression changed to that of a terrified child. Our eyes locked in recognition. I think we both understood that she was doomed.

Of course, this may not be the moment of mutual understanding Kara makes it out to be. It reads like a re-telling of the Orpheus and Eurydice story, which would line up with Kara’s depiction of the Congo as “hell on earth,” a “hellscape,” but how much is Kara reading into this moment of “recognition”? What does Nikki’s expression convey? Why the dramatic use of ellipses? How much of this is projection? The last we saw of her, Nikki was tending to her child; Kara didn’t stay with her but followed Arthur down the trench. Nikki might well have drawn other conclusions about Kara’s passing interest in her or his intentions.

Kara makes similar moves elsewhere: at a brothel in Kasulo, Kara sees “a young girl wearing a deep violet dress, with her hair tied in pigtails” who gives off a “childlike radiance”; at a church service in Fungurume, “a child looked at me, his wide eyes alight and comforting.” From this look, Kara “understood at last how the people of the Congo survived their daily torment–they loved God with full and fiery hearts and drew comfort from the promise of salvation.”

At other moments in Cobalt Red, nothing so clear comes of such looks and shared glances. At Tenke Fungurume, “no one smiles,” or at least not in Kara’s presence. At the Shabara mine, after a fight distracts Kara’s official minders, Kara “locked eyes with some of the nearby workers. Some gazed back curiously, others defensively, and some looked right through me as if I were just another chunk of stone in the dirt.” Another teenage mother, fifteen-year-old Elodie, orphaned and forced to turn to prostitution to survive, grows “weary of [Kara’s] presence. I was just another unwelcome burden.”

For Kara, Elodie “was the nullity of the world,” and his meeting with her seems to move him more than any other encounter he has in the Congo. Upon hearing that Elodie has died, he sits beneath a tree to pray and ends up imagining her final moments. He cannot: he can only wonder what she thought and knew and felt, but he ends up imagining Elodie, too, praying “to whichever God might be listening, ‘Please take me home.'”

At times Kara has to leave out important details on purpose, to protect his subjects; at others, it’s unclear why he would. To take just one example: a distraught mother living near the Tenke Fungurume mine asks Kara for help for her child Makano, who was badly injured in a mining accident and is now dying. After agonizing over the risks of giving a source money, Kara admits: “I did what I could to assist Makano as discreetly as possible.” What, exactly, did he do?

The uncertainties that attend so many of the encounters in Cobalt Red are compounded by the fact that most of Kara’s interviews are conducted with the help of “numerous guides and translators” like Arthur, Oliver, and Augustin. How much gets lost in translation is impossible to say. At one point, Kara meets a girl named Aimee, who looks to be about eight or nine, rinsing and stacking stones.

I started to speak with her about her work as a group of women gathered around in a protective formation. I had just about managed to learn that Aimee’s parents were dead and that she lived with an aunt in Kanina when she suddenly began to scream at the top of her lungs. The women shouted angrily at me and moved to console the child. The commotion escalated, and the…soldiers rushed over. My translator tried to calm the situation, but Aimee would not stop screaming. I did not understand what I had done to upset her.

He leaves Lake Golf “amid a storm of protest” that he himself caused. Just a few moments earlier, he has been hearing from other workers about “the men” who buy the heterogenite at Lake Golf, but given “all the talking, shouting, and sloshing going on,” he can’t follow up.

His account of a meeting in Tenke seems to involve a similar lapse of understanding: a man named Kafufu tells Kara he has “something urgent” to show him — a village carpeted in sulfuric acid powder — but it is never clear in Kara’s telling why Kafufu is so insistent that it cannot wait. At yet another moment, Kara’s translator Augustin is “distraught after several days of trying to find the words in English that captured the grief being described in Swahili. He would at time drop his head and sob before attempting to translate what was said.”

There are no ready solutions to the brutalities Kara witnesses in the cobalt mines of the Congo, and there are no easy ways to ensure the reliability and truthfulness of what he, or any human rights researcher, witnesses. Kara seems painfully aware of his own project’s limitations, and he embraces the difficulties of translating the suffering of the Congolese people for readers in the rich world.

In an epilogue, he sets out what he considers a “first step” in surmounting these problems: “advancing the ability of the Congolese people to conduct their own research and safely speak for themselves.” We can believe him when he says that “voices on the ground tell a different, if not antithetical, story to the one told at the top.” Ultimately, we at the top have much more to fear from the truth than those at the bottom.

Lithium Executives, US Military, and Diplomats Discuss Shovel Ready Projects in South America

A clip from this Atlantic Council presentation posted on social media by Bolivia’s Kawsachun News has already caused some fear and loathing. It shows General Laura Richardson, Commander of the US Southern Command, unapologetically discussing US interests in Latin America’s natural resources: lithium, oil, gold, fresh water, and the forests of the Amazon. I was struck, as well, by another moment: Richardson’s description of a meeting she had last week, on Wednesday, January 18th, with US ambassadors to Chile and Argentina along with executives from Livent and Albemarle, two US-based lithium companies operating in South America. Here’s that moment. It merits some careful attention.

Update, 26 March 2023: Two months later, Richardson’s remarks still rankle. Just this past week, in a speech commemorating the Battle of Calama, Bolivian President Luis Arce reiterated calls for an OPEC-like lithium cartel and commented, “We don’t want our lithium to be in the Southern Command’s crosshairs, nor do we want it to be a reason for destabilizing democratically elected governments or foreign harassment.” To tamp down the controversy, the US embassy in Bolivia issued a communique earlier this month calling for “international cooperation” and saying the United States respects the sovereignty of states and their right to develop natural resources free from outside interference.

A Newer Map of Lake Superior Mining and Mineral Exploration

 

This map helps us imagine what the onshoring of critical minerals production could bring to the Lake Superior region.

This looks like the most recent version of a map I’ve posted before, in 2013. It’s published by the Transportation and Resource Extraction Committee of the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission.

The GLIFWC map appears on page 73 of the 2020-2024 Lake Superior Lakewide Action and Management Plan put out last week by the governments of the United States and Canada.

The report includes lots of information about mining in the Lake Superior region that deserves consideration. The report also notes: “The cumulative impact of mines on the ecological integrity of Lake Superior is not well understood.”