Two Sets of Boundary Waters Documents: The Fallout from the Reversal

Two sets of Boundary Waters documents arrived yesterday afternoon.

The first set of documents is the tenth supplemental production — the December production — in response to my FOIA litigation. It includes more records from Briana Collier, 411 pages dating back to 2018 and mainly to do with the fallout from the Boundary Waters reversal: attorneys at Interior prepare for litigation over the reversal and start to gather materials to respond FOIA requests (including mine). I’ve put these materials online here.

The Collier correspondence shows attorneys at Interior searching for and reviewing letters and lease files from 1966 forward to prepare for litigation in the Voyageur case, for instance. In one exchange, the litigation specialist at BLM is apparently trying to reconcile the current lease form with the historical leases. Her questions have been redacted:

This same collection of correspondence also offers a glimpse of attorneys at Interior processing multiple FOIA requests at around the same time that Solicitor Daniel Jorjani was putting the Awareness Review Policy formally in place. There appears to have been some confusion about how to run the records search and how to include custodians who had taken on new assignments, in different departments. At one point, Collier apologizes for the “mess”:

The second set of records in this release includes 126 pages of documents previously withheld until the White House and the Office of the Secretary could review them. These records are now online here. They consist mostly of regular briefings by White House Liaison Lori Mashburn — another political appointee who came to Interior via the Heritage Foundation and the Trump 2016 campaign. These briefings present roundups of news coverage, summaries of schedules and announcements, tweets by Zinke that Mashburn deems “notable,” and the occasional flattering detail — e.g, Zinke’s appearance on the History Channel program Navy Seals: Kill or Capture.

Pages 107-126 of this 126 page document present Daniel Jorjani’s email correspondence and a briefing prepared for “the Duluth trip” (Trump’s June 2018 trip to Duluth, which I wrote about here) by Mitch Leverette, Acting Eastern States Director. The part of Leverette’s memo dealing with “Federal permits, leases, and extension requests” has been fully redacted. The issue was still very much in the works:


One takeaway from these documents is that the Boundary Waters reversal — the Jorjani legal memo of December 2017 — ruled in Antofagasta’s favor but unsettled the regulatory picture for much of 2018. “Questions regarding how to interpret the original lease terms have also persisted,” notes Leverette in his memorandum; and Interior was dealing with other questions as well. An exchange in the December production shows Kevin Baker, Vice President for Legal Affairs at Twin Metals, trying to sort out some “confusion based on the recent approvals” from the Bureau of Land Management and US Forest Service.

Subsequent actions by Interior and USDA were intended to give Baker and executives at Twin Metals and Antofagasta the results they sought and the clarity they needed to proceed. Now, with the arrival of a new administration only weeks away, things may seem little less settled.

Read more about the Boundary Waters reversal here.

More Meaningful Consultations: A Comment on the Biden-Harris Plan for Tribal Nations

The incoming administration promises to reinstate the tribal consultation mandate. More can be done to meet the standard set by the RESPECT Act and make consultations more meaningful.

Federal agencies are required to consult with Native American tribes (and with Alaska Native Corporations) on infrastructure projects — highways, dams, or railways, for instance — and on permits for mines, pipelines, and other industrial development projects when they affect tribal lands and interests. Consultation policies and practices vary from agency to agency, but in all cases these consultations are supposed to be “meaningful.” What makes them so needs to be carefully spelled out.

“To promote robust and meaningful consultation,” the Biden-Harris Plan for Tribal Nations promises to reinstate the Consultation mandate put in place by the Obama administration and “ensure that tribal consultations adopt best practices consistent with principles reflected in the RESPECT Act.” The Act in question is H.R. 2689, which languished in the House after being introduced by Representative Raul M. Grijalva of Arizona in the 115th Congress. The Act sought to establish, among other things, this Sense of Congress:

effective, meaningful consultation requires a two-way exchange of information, a willingness to listen, an attempt to understand and genuinely consider each other’s opinions, beliefs, and desired outcomes, and a seeking of agreement on how to proceed concerning the issues at hand; and consultation can be considered effective and meaningful when each party demonstrates a genuine commitment to learn, acknowledge, and respect the positions, perspectives, and concerns of the other parties.

The Act sets the bar for everyone involved. It describes meaningful consultation as deliberation among equals, a good faith undertaking to seek (but not necessarily reach) agreement together. It places more emphasis on recognizing different perspectives and positions than on reconciling them. It highlights a genuine and joint commitment to listen and develop understanding of each party and of the issues. Meaningful consultation will go well beyond mere transaction — or information exchange — to encompass learning and collaboration. Rooted in mutual respect, consultation can be both a dignifying encounter and an adventure.

The standard the RESPECT Act sets for meaningful consultation is worth reaching for right now, even if it remains to be seen whether Representative Grijalva will reintroduce the bill and whether the 117th Congress will make it law. Here are a few areas where work might begin.

  • Information ethics should develop with information systems.

A 2019 Government Accountability Office study of 21 Federal agencies discovered an information gap: agencies simply do not have accurate contact information for the appropriate tribal representatives. To remedy the situation, the GAO recommends that the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council develop a plan for establishing a central federal information system. While centralization might serve the FPISC goal of administrative efficiency, it can also raise significant issues around security and trust. Sharing control of data and data governance with tribes might help alleviate such concerns.

Information systems are already evolving to accommodate new collaboration technologies (like channel-based messaging and videoconferencing) to support consultation. Best practices still need to be identified and shared; and, just as importantly, inequities need to be addressed. As noted in the Biden-Harris plan, rural areas and reservations are disproportionately underserved by high-speed internet. It will take significant investment in broadband and 5G before new applications can be brought into the mix.

Where information technology can help consultation in other ways — with topological, geological, and archaeological reviews — other ethical considerations arise. Centering the discussion on shared data and published scientific information can help temper conversation and prevent powerful outside groups from exercising undue influence, but the model also has its limits. When scientific understanding appears to be incommensurate with tribal knowledge of the land, waters, and regional history, respectful consultation will strive to give both due consideration.

  • Dialogue will determine the value of information.

The text of the RESPECT Act itself could be amended to reflect its own sense of what makes consultation meaningful. The Act aims to “ensure that meaningful Tribal input is an integral part of the Federal decision-making process.” In this caption and throughout the Bill, the effect of the word “input” is to cast tribes as information sources, not full-fledged participants. Gathering or recording tribal input is only the first step at building dialogue, where information acquires meaning.

The colorless, technocratic term “input” appears to have found its way into the legislative lexicon via the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Section 204), which calls upon agencies to “permit elected officers of State, local, and tribal governments…to provide meaningful and timely input.” Five years later, Executive Order 13175, still the touchstone for tribal consultation policies, moves beyond granting tribes permission to mandating “an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input.” This order does not, however, contemplate ways federal agencies might be accountable to their tribal counterparts, as they would be in a cooperative undertaking.

No surprise, then, that sixty-two percent of tribes surveyed by the GAO “identified concerns that agencies often do not adequately consider the tribal input they collect during consultation when making decisions about proposed infrastructure projects.” This finding appears to indicate that agencies cannot consider all by themselves the input they collect. Due consideration will take building “meaningful dialogue” — as a 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Tribal Consultation puts it — through “regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration.” It is best undertaken jointly.

  • Consultation still falls short of consent.

The 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples establishes that states “shall consult and cooperate with the indigenous peoples” to this clearly-stated end: “in order to obtain” Free, Prior, and Informed Consent. A 2010 State Department Announcement of US support for the Declaration fails to take into account the subordinating conjunction “in order to” and the purpose it unambiguously indicates, allowing only that the US understands the Declaration “to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders.” Instead of securing informed consent, as required by UNDRIP, the consultation process becomes a way of reserving discretion.

From the tribes’ perspective, as summarized in a 2017 study, consultation is merely box-checking unless undertaken with the aim of obtaining free, prior, and informed consent or at least reaching compromise. The Biden-Harris plan takes a step in this direction, promising to “uphold leasing and right-of-way regulations that strengthen tribal sovereignty and ensure tribal consent on tribal lands.” The plan makes no mention of the UN Declaration, however, and it remains to be seen how far this deference will extend.

Consent places front and center issues of self-determination, of autonomy and, in the context of government-to-government relations, sovereignty. One test of respect for self-determination comes when tribal leaders withhold consent or say “no,” as the obligation to obtain consent clearly implies the right to withhold it. Efforts to overlook or sidestep that obligation altogether are bound to diminish confidence that consultations will be appropriately heeded and outcomes will be just.

This serious shortcoming — which cries out for remedy — need not be a fatal flaw. “No” might signal a standoff or it might offer an opportunity to articulate and explore alternative plans. Good faith, constructive disagreement can test unexamined assumptions, illuminate unseen risk, and bring new interlocutors to the table. Agreeing to disagree need not mark the end of negotiation; it can indicate that parties will acknowledge differences, respect the distance they establish, and rejoin the dialogue.

Though consultations do not satisfy the human rights obligation to secure free, prior, and informed consent and do not necessarily yield agreements, they can help agencies take tribal interests into account and help tribes gain better understanding of (and some say in) decisions that affect them.

On a practical level, starting consultations early and returning to them throughout the life of a project can prevent conflict and costly delay further down the road. Just as importantly, consultation can help agencies gain much-needed perspective on emerging risks and complex problems, from economic and energy policies to food security and environmental protection.  And taking steps to improve tribal consultations might also raise the bar for other public consultations, making government a little more responsive to all citizens.

Ultimately, however, consultation will be meaningful only to the extent that all parties so find it.

Update: On January 26, President Biden issued an Executive Memorandum on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening Nation-to-Nation Relationships, reinstating the consultation mandate. The Memorandum directs agency heads to consult with tribes before developing a detailed plan of actions the agency will take in this regard and to keep the OMB apprised of progress made against the plan.

Another Political Appointee’s Calendar Among New Boundary Waters Documents

In response to my Boundary Waters FOIA case, the US Department of the Interior today released another 446 pages. I put them online here.

This release includes the 2017 calendar of Timothy Williams, a political operative who came to the Department of Interior via the Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity and Trump’s 2016 campaign in Nevada. “Although Williams doesn’t appear to have experience working on issues that fall within the purview of Interior,” notes the watchdog Department of Influence site, “the department’s press release announcing his hire advertises that Williams is an ‘avid sportsman and accomplished hunter and fisherman.'” Williams is now Principal Deputy Director at the Office of Intergovernmental and External Affairs at the Interior Department. Last year he was the subject of an ethics complaint filed by the Campaign Legal Center.

According to an email accompanying it, Williams’ calendar was scheduled to be released and posted (presumably to the Department’s calendar site) on August 31, 2018, but I don’t see it there and can’t find it elsewhere online. Maybe its release was held up for some reason. In any case it’s new to me, and even at first glance, Williams calendar will allow me to make some additions to the Twin Metals timeline. For example, a June 22, 2017 meeting Williams had with Chad Horrell of the DCI Group (on behalf of Sportsmen for the Boundary Waters) and a “quick huddle” on December 21, 2017 to discuss the Solicitor’s reversal of the M-Opinion along with the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the signing of a Secretarial Order.

Taking a broader view, what I said the other day about the last release can also be said of this one: this looks more like a document dump than a meaningful and organized response to my request. The release includes another multiple page spread sheet of FOIA requests sent out for review by Justin Wilkinson from the Secretary’s FOIA Office under the FOIA Awareness policy. The only noteworthy thing about this item might be that it demonstrates, once again, that the claims about custody and control advanced by Interior in the initial stages of this case are claims of convenience, and the firewall between the Office of the Secretary and the Solicitor’s Office is a lot more permeable than they pretended.

The Office of the Solicitor is withholding 16 pages in full. It’s possible from the emails included here to guess what some of those documents are: for example, a “proposed agenda” attached to an August 28, 2018 email from an attorney at the DOJ’s Environment and Natural Resources Division is probably among the withheld documents. But I can’t be sure, of course, because the letter from the FOIA office specifies only that some documents are being withheld, not which documents. I’m also unsure whether these documents or other redactions and documents withheld under Exemption 5 will be covered by the Supreme Court’s pending decision in US Fish and Wildlife v. Sierra Club; and from what I am reading, it’s likely that decision will protect deliberative process at the cost of greater transparency.

Read more about the Boundary Waters reversal here

Some New Boundary Waters Documents, Many Others Still Under White House Review

Yesterday I complained about delays in document production; today a batch of delayed documents arrived. I’ve posted them to documentcloud here.

This appears to be the September production described in the October 6 Joint Status Report, which was held up because some pages required reviews by the White House and the Office of the Secretary. The letter that accompanies this release provides a little more information and tells a slightly different story.

Whereas the Joint Status Report said 6 pages were still awaiting White House consultation, this letter brings that number up to 111 pages. What’s in those pages, and who at the White House needs to review them, remains unclear; but it looks as if when it comes to Antofagasta’s leases near the Boundary Waters, White House involvement with the Office of the Solicitor is more extensive than previously acknowledged.

I’m just starting to review the 583 pages released. They include Gareth Rees’ 2017 calendar, which has already been released; a long list of FOIA requests attached to an email dated July 11, 2018, asking those whose names appear in the requests to review and comment within 72 hours, in keeping with the newly established Awareness Process for FOIA Productions. With the exception of that email, which is of some interest, given the controversy over the Awareness Process, these pages look more like a document dump than an organized and meaningful response to my request. But I plan to go through them and make what additions I can to the timeline.

And even a quick, initial review turns up a few highlights: a list of prohibited holdings (or investments) to prevent conflicts of interest, issued by the Department of the Interior Ethics Office, and which Doug Domenech appears to have greeted with some alarm: “Wow. These lists seem substantially longer than the one that was given to me before. Are they changing?” I posted the list on Twitter just a little while ago. I don’t understand why Antofagasta is not listed along with Duluth Metals and Franconia Minerals.

Doug Domenech counts as a person of interest in my investigation. He is one of the first people to brief the White House on Twin Metals, in June of 2017, just one month after Antofagasta executives fly up from Chile for meetings at Interior and the White House. He does not appear to have been in the White House loop in June of 2018, however, as the White House prepared for President Trump’s visit to Duluth, Minnesota. (More on that here.)

The only trace I’ve seen of those preparations is included in this document production: a June 15, 2018 email from Daniel Jorjani to David Bernhardt, forwarding the Twin Metals Information Memorandum that the Bureau of Land Management prepared for “the Duluth trip.”

The Information Memorandum is not included in this release; perhaps those are the 5 pages withheld in full. But sometime between June 15 and June 20, someone in the White House must have worked their way through it and developed talking points for the announcement Trump made on that trip: “we will soon be taking the first steps to rescind the federal withdrawal in Superior National Forest and restore mineral exploration for our amazing people and miners and workers and for the people of Minnesota, one of the great natural reserves of the world.”

The June 2018 Information Memorandum must have sketched out a plan to “rescind the federal withdrawal.” That wasn’t just a throwaway line, but one Trump read directly from the teleprompter to big applause. As we know, the rescission would not officially happen until September of that year, when Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue canceled the two-year scientific study. His explanation that the study had yielded no new scientific information appears to have already been a foregone conclusion for a few months.

Documents Delayed and Permits Accelerated: A Critical Minerals Play?

Is the Trump administration preparing to invoke emergency powers in order to accelerate permitting for Antofagasta’s sulfide mining project near the Boundary Waters? Listen to what Pete Stauber and Mike Pence were saying in Hibbing the other day.

It has been over two months — 78 days, in fact — since the Department of Interior has released any documents in response to my FOIA lawsuit, despite a February 7, 2020 court order requiring regular monthly releases of 750 pages. While I consider options to get the process back on track, I am also trying to figure out what the delay might mean.

An October 6, 2020 Joint Status Report set out some reasons for the delay.

It’s hard to know what to make of these representations. Let’s start with the September releases, since the reviews mentioned in the connection with the October releases sound a little more standard (and are for that reason even more opaque).

In a letter dated October 31, 2019, I was told by Department of Interior Counsel that all requests for agency records related to Secretary Zinke “must” go through the Secretary’s office, so the Secretary’s records were not, and would not ever be, included in searches the Office of the Solicitor. How, then, does the Office of the Secretary claim “equities” in documents from the Office of the Solicitor? It looks as if the firewall they tried to erect between the two offices didn’t hold up or was nothing more than a temporary blind. The back and forth we had over Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, a landmark case regarding “custody” and “control” of responsive records, probably needs revisiting.

That leaves the six pages being sent to the White House for “consultation.” What’s in those six pages, and who is undertaking the review? One guess is that they concern communications between Daniel Jorjani and Michael Catanzaro, who until April 2018 was Special Assistant to the President for Domestic Energy and Environmental Policy. Catanzaro met regularly with then-Deputy Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt, and he appears to have acted as a sort of White House liaison on the Twin Metals matter.

A front page story in the June 26, 2019 New York Times has Catanzaro meeting with Antofagasta executives as early as May of 2017, and the timeline shows him meeting with Daniel Jorjani about the “Minnesota project” in August of that same year. Stephen Vaden, a political appointee at USDA, also attended that meeting and Vaden appears to have stayed in the Minnesota loop to keep Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue apprised of legal developments. (For the next year or so, Perdue would bide his time, lie and equivocate, before abruptly canceling a planned two-year scientific study to determine whether federal lands bordering the Boundary Waters should be withdrawn from mineral development.)

Catanzaro has returned to lobbying for oil, gas, and mining clients, and it seems a little far-fetched to think the hold up might be due to White House sensitivities around Vaden, whose nomination to the United States Court of International Trade is now awaiting a vote in the Senate. Why, then, the consultation at the White House?

Consider that this delay might not less about protecting persons, or political appointees, and more about protecting a position that the White House, the Solicitor’s Office, the Secretary of the Interior, USDA and Antofagasta Plc have jointly developed — seemingly in tandem with their efforts to renew Antofagasta’s leases in northern Minnesota. The position is simply that Twin Metals will be a source of critical minerals.

Only two days after Daniel Jorjani met with Catanzaro and Vaden in August of 2017, the Department of Interior hosted the CEO Critical Minerals Roundtable; and though Antofagasta was not among the mining companies represented on that occasion, the company changed the description of its Twin Metals project to include cobalt — on the list of “critical minerals” — for its 2017 Annual Report. (The 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports make no mention of cobalt.) Immediately after Interior published its list of critical minerals, Gary Lawkowski, who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management and was then Daniel Jorjani’s Deputy, recommended a public relations strategy that positioned Twin Metals as a critical minerals play. “One thing you all may want to note — the Forest Service has indicated that they believe there are potentially cobalt and platinum deposits underneath Superior National Forest.” And, as I mentioned in the FOIA webinar I gave in July, Interior has now started to redact Lawkowski’s use of the phrase “critical minerals” in Twin Metals document releases, which indicates some new sensitivity on the point.

This might help explain the legal reviews holding up the October production as well. But the real issue here doesn’t have to do with the documents I’m expecting. It has to do with how the White House, the Department of Interior, and other agencies are developing the critical minerals position on Twin Metals. We can get a sense of where things seem to be heading from the speech Representative Pete Stauber gave to warm up the rally crowd in Hibbing, Minnesota for Vice President Mike Pence just the other day:

Plaid jacket jingoism. But note especially the way Stauber deliberately conflates “copper-nickel mining” with “strategic metals mining,” and organizes the Twin Metals project under emergency powers the president arrogated to himself in the September 30 Executive Order on critical minerals. Pence softened things a bit when he elaborated on the theme, but he told the crowd that the Executive Order “cuts burdensome regulation and eliminates permitting delays.”

The argument Stauber and Pence were starting to make in Hibbing appears to be that the White House can invoke emergency powers in order to accelerate or even sidestep environmental review on behalf of Antofagasta, because Twin Metals is a source of critical minerals and therefore covered by Executive Order.

The Order asks the Secretary of Energy to identify “all such regulations that may warrant revision or reconsideration in order to expand and protect the domestic supply chain for minerals” and to propose changes within 90 days. That puts us at the end of December, and, if current polls hold, right near the end of Trump’s presidency. In the meantime, the order also authorizes the Secretary of the Interior and other agency heads to “use all available authorities to accelerate the issuance of permits and the completion of projects in connection with expanding and protecting the domestic supply chain for minerals.” If Trump loses Tuesday’s election, they’ll have just a couple of months to get this done.

Read more about the Boundary Waters reversal here.

1913 Massacre — October Broadcast and November Streaming

1913 Massacre, the documentary film I made with Ken Ross about the Italian Hall disaster, will air on WNMU-TV (Marquette, Michigan) at 9PM on Friday, October 30, as part of the Beaumier Heritage Documentary Series.

Then, for the whole month of November, everyone can stream the film from the WNMU-TV site. The film will also be available through the PBS Passport app.

The WNMU site links to this 2013 review by Bill Meyer in People’s World.

Seamless editing, engrossing interviews and a stirring well-integrated music soundtrack make the film flow like long lost friends catching up on history. Arlo makes the point early on that it was folk songs where people learned about working class history, such as this tragic event, that may have been forgotten to the world otherwise. This movie could be called a “folk movie” as it tells the story in the same dramatic and powerful manner. It joins the ranks of great progressive movies based on famous songs, that include Strange Fruit, about the song about lynchings written by Abel Meeropol and made famous by Billie Holliday, Alice’s Restaurant based on Arlo’s famous song, and Bill Moyer’s Amazing Grace, a probing study of the history of the classic hymn.

After the WNMU run, Ken and I plan to arrange online streaming through Vimeo and possibly Amazon Prime.

New Citigroup CEO Has Strong Ties to Chile’s Luksic Group

Goodbye to all that? With Andronico Luksic Craig looking on, Jane Fraser makes her exit from the May 2019 press event marking the repayment of the Banco de Chile’s subordinated debt.

Jane Fraser, who was named last week to succeed Michael Corbat as CEO of Citigroup, has longstanding business ties to one of Chile’s most powerful business conglomerates, the Luksic Group.

Antofagasta Plc, the company with plans to mine copper and nickel on the edge of the Boundary Waters, is among the conglomerate’s principal holdings — which is why I thought it would be instructive to start looking at the Fraser-Luksic connection as Citigroup prepares for its leadership transition.

It’s unclear just how much exposure Fraser has had to the mining side of the sprawling Luksic business empire. Citibank’s dealings with the Luksic Group over the years appear to be primarily through Quiñenco SA, the financial holding company through which the group controls its investments. It is clear, however, that Fraser enjoys a fairly close business relationship with Andronico Luksic Craig.

Fraser’s relationship with Andronico Luksic Craig and the Luksic Group developed as she came up through Citigroup’s Latin American leadership ranks. After a four-year stint from 2009-2013 as CEO of Citi Private Bank, which serves the bank’s wealthiest customers, the Luksic family possibly among them, Fraser was CEO of Citigroup Latin America from 2015-2018. During that period, she also served as Vice-Chairman of the Board of Banco de Chile, co-chair with Andronico Luksic Craig.

The role came with the job. In 2007, Citigroup and Luksic-controlled Quiñenco SA established a partnership that gave Citi a 32.9 percent stake in LQ Inversiones Financieras, the Quiñenco subsidiary that has held a controlling stake in Banco de Chile since 2002. (This was, not coincidentally, the year Andronico Luksic Abaroa handed the reins to his sons Andronico and Guillermo.) The Luksic Group grew rapidly after its move into banking, growing in value from $1.9 billion to $15.6 billion over a ten year period, according to a 2017 London Mining Network report, and “profits were increasingly linked to financial capital and speculation.” Citi took part in that spectacular growth, and in 2010 increased its stake in LQIF to 50 percent.

The partnership with Citigroup also helped the bank through the final stages of its recovery from the financial crises of 1982-3, culminating in the repayment of the bank’s subordinated debt in May of 2019. A “dark chapter” of the Pinochet period had come to a close, thirty years after Pinochet fell from power. The event must have had special significance for Luksic, whose family had decamped to London after the 1973 military coup and only returned to Chilean investment circles with the onset of the financial crisis and recession of the 1980s. Settling the debt of the Banco de Chile must have felt like an act of historical redemption.

In the press conference organized for the occasion, Fraser appeared in the Paseo Ahumada side by side with Luksic and Mario Marcel, the president of Chile’s central bank.

Fraser is now set to become one of Wall Street’s most powerful bankers. Asked to comment on her promotion, Luksic was effusive in his praise, calling Fraser a “pioneering woman” and a “tremendous leader” who will make “an enormous contribution not only to Citigroup, but to the entire financial industry.”

It is still too early to say what, if anything, her move north might mean for Luksic’s business fortunes or the Chilean mining company’s North American ambitions.

An Appeal to the State Department

Earlier this morning I appealed the State Department’s denial of my request for expedited processing on two Freedom of Information Act requests made in the fall of 2018.

As I mentioned in last month’s webinar, even though FOIA specifies that “records shall be made promptly available,” many agencies have a backlog of requests and some requests are deliberately slow-walked.

The State Department does not expect to complete these two 2018 requests until 2022. No reasonable definition of “promptly” contemplates a delay of four years, and, as I argue in my appeal, recent Federal government action — the June 30 Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Twin Metals project — compels the release of these records. Why? Because in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, the Bureau of Land Management plans to take public comment and hold public meetings on Antofagasta’s Minnesota project. The public can’t participate in a meaningful way or make considered judgments when critical facts are withheld.

I posted a copy of my appeal on Twitter.

The appeal’s argument about NEPA, which provides for meaningful public consultation, brings me back to a point I tried to stress in the webinar: what’s at stake here is not only a mining project or economic development in northern Minnesota or the fate of the Boundary Waters, though all of those things are matters of great concern, but also questions of meaningful consultation, citizen participation, and good government.

Both NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act are, or at least could be, conducive to responsible democratic governance. They are designed to make government conform to citizen demand, or at least make government inform, include, and answer to the public.

Charles Tilly puts it neatly: “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, mutually binding consultation.” If that is the kind of government we want to have, then those are the political relations we need to create, support, and insist upon. The state isn’t going to do that for us, and the current regime appears to be doing everything it can to frustrate and undermine those relations.

Update 28 Sept 2020. The Office of Information Programs and Services denied this appeal on September 24, saying I did not show a compelling need, and rejecting my argument that due to Federal government action my request meets the threshold of 22 C.F.R. 171.11(f)(2).

Selective Evidence and the Office of the Solicitor

As attorneys at the US Department of Interior drafted a Solicitors’ opinion from a memo written by a mining company lobbyist, they sought historical evidence to support the lobbyist’s claims. Since issuing the opinion in December of 2017, they have kept the evidence they found from being fully disclosed; and they have also failed to account for historical evidence that runs against the finding the mining company wanted.

During last month’s webinar, I mentioned that attorneys at the Department of the Interior and lobbyists for Chilean mining giant Antofagasta often seem to be singing from the same song sheet. By way of example, I pointed to the fact that both the mining company and the government started talking about Antofagasta’s Twin Metals project as a source of “critical minerals,” and in particular cobalt, at the same time. To illustrate, I included a document in the webinar slides where Interior’s Gary Lawkowski proposed using critical minerals as the cornerstone of the public relations strategy around the Boundary Waters reversal. That’s a topic I hope to have more to say about in the future, especially if I succeed in getting those talking points Lawkowski drafted released in unredacted form.

In a comment posted to the Zoom chat during the webinar, Steve Timmer suggested an even better example: the very legal opinion that allowed Interior to renew Antofagasta’s mineral leases near the Boundary Waters — a document known as an M-Opinion — was derived almost entirely from a 2016 letter to then-Solicitor Hilary Tompkins written by WilmerHale’s Seth P. Waxman on behalf of his client, Antofagasta.

I’ve written about Waxman as the architect of the Boundary Waters reversal before, but it’s still disconcerting to think that attorneys at the Department of Interior were taking their cues from a mining company lobbyist and faithfully following his line of argument. The lobbyist, after all, is hired to advance the financial interests of the mining company, not to act in the public interest — which is what government officials, public servants, are supposed to do.

A November 7, 2017 email shows attorneys at Interior pursuing Waxman’s argument that a mineral lease form issued in 2004 is “ambiguous.” The email is reproduced several times in one set of Boundary Waters documents I obtained through FOIA, but it appears unredacted only once. (Now that I’ve been able to read it, I’ll add it to the Twin Metals Timeline.) It’s an email from Jack Haugrud to Briana Collier, asking for “more evidence” that will help them grapple with a key ambiguity Waxman identified.

It’s unclear why the Solicitor’s office would want to redact both the content of Haugrud’s email and the subject of the email (“Twin-More Evidence”), especially considering the ambiguity Haugrud identifies would turn out to be central to the argument of the December 2017 M-Opinion. “Twin Metals is entitled to a third renewal,” according to the Jorjani opinion. Why? For the same reason Waxman identified: “the renewal terms of the 2004 lease form do not govern. The form is ambiguous, and the intent of the parties to keep operative the terms of the 1966 leases becomes clear once the BLM’s decision files are examined.”

So Haugrud writes to Collier looking for “anything from 1999-2004” that would clear up this ambiguity, and “more conclusively show that BLM intended to incorporate the 1966 lease terms into the 2004 leases.” The goal here was clearly not to air all the historical evidence, but to show that the 1966 leases “govern.” This is an exercise in foregone conclusions — Waxman’s conclusions.

In reply, Collier attaches a set of documents she’s gotten from colleagues in the Milwaukee office of USDA. The first paragraphs of a number of these documents have also been redacted, but it’s pretty clear the redacted paragraphs set out terms of renewal, including stipulations. I posted a couple of these documents on Twitter the other day.

 

For what it’s worth, I’m going to appeal these exemptions, since the agency decisions they report are final, and can’t reasonably be construed as deliberative or privileged. Why were these paragraphs blacked out in the first place? Why redact correspondence between Interior and mineral lease holders from 1987, 1999, or 2003? I could hazard a guess, but that won’t really change the fact that the stipulations and conditions they set out are, for now, hidden from the public. As a result, it’s hard to have confidence in the M-Opinion’s summary:

In sum, we have found no documents or other evidence that indicate in any way that the 2004 renewals were to be on altered terms or conditions from the 1989 leases. Because the 1989 leases renewed the leases under the same terms and conditions as the original 1966 leases, those terms remain operative in the 2004 renewal and, as discussed below, entitle Twin Metals to a third renewal.

In the end, as I’ve noted before, Daniel Jorjani and his team of attorneys simply took Waxman’s cues. So the best way to deal with the ambiguity of the 2004 forms, Jorjani writes, is to consider “extrinsic evidence beyond the ‘four corners’ of the document…to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties.” Here, too, Jorjani will follow Waxman in seizing on the decision files of the Bureau of Land Management to show “that the BLM renewed the leases in 1989 under the same terms as the 1966 leases and did so again in 2004.”

And what were those terms? If you adhere to Waxman and Jorjani’s reading of the evidence, the terms are clear: the mining company, the holder of the leases, is entitled to a “non-discretionary” right to renewal:. because of recognized operational problems in the area, producing minerals in the short term would have been impossible. The leases thus would serve no rational purpose absent a non-discretionary right to renew; no company would undertake the necessary investment for exploration and development knowing that it could be unilaterally deprived of any ability to recoup that investment.” In other words, northern Minnesota is a tough place to operate, so there was never any requirement to bring the leases into production. Solicitor Tompkins was wrong to say there was.

There are a couple of problems with this line of argument. The first has to do with the recourse to extrinsic evidence. Once you go beyond the four corners of the document, where do you stop? Why are BLM decision files from the 1980s the only extrinsic, or historical evidence to consider? To my mind, there are at least three other kinds of extrinsic evidence that need to be taken into account: the redacted paragraphs in the BLM correspondence noticed here; the provisions of the 1978 Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act; and the good faith representations made by the Department of Interior when the agency first issued the 1966 leases.

That last item brings me to the second problem with this Waxman-Jorjani line of argument. As Representative Alan Lowenthal has repeatedly pointed out, there is clear historical evidence that the original 1966 leases did not confer a non-discretionary right to renew. There were conditions and stipulations. One was a production requirement. That is, the 1966 leases would not be renewed if the company failed to bring them into production — to start mining — by the end of the primary term of the leases: 1986. The Bureau of Land Management said so in the press release it issued at the time, and in an earlier post I produced several Minnesota newspaper accounts reporting on the production requirement. Here is another that I found just this morning, an article that ran in the New York Times on June 15, 1966.

It seems likely the Times and other newspapers explicitly mention this detail not just because it was included in the BLM press release, but mainly because it was a critical piece of information for investors. Purchasers of International Nickel Company stock at the time would have wanted to know what plans there were to develop the newly-acquired Minnesota leases and what commitment the company had to make a going venture of them. Fifty-four years later, the American public deserves the same consideration.

Update August 28, 2020: An Amended Complaint filed in Wilderness Society et al. v. Bernhardt et al. might help explain why the first paragraphs of those Milwaukee documents were redacted before being released.

The complaint quotes an email from a legislative assistant for Congressman Pete Stauber to a Forest Service Congressional liaison: “I just wanted to touch base on the Twin Metals situation. The company is getting increasingly concerned about the stipulations put forward by the Forest Service on the up or down vote they require for mineral lease renewals every ten years. Both Reps. [Tom] Emmer and Stauber are increasingly concerned that these stipulations could deter Twin Metals from making further investment in the area and slow down economic development in turn.”

Under pressure from Stauber and Emmer, we learn, the Forest Service waived its statutory right to consent to all future lease renewals. This was a departure — an arbitrary and unlawful one, according to the complaint — from the terms of the 1966 and 2004 leases. The Forest Service established new stipulations, including “(1) a right to perpetual renewal of the Leases if Twin Metals complies with the Leases’ terms and stipulations; and (2) a stipulation that if Twin Metals fails to meet certain milestones for developing and constructing a mine during the 10-year renewal period, the Leases will terminate, but with provisions that can toll the Leases’ term.”

It seems the redacted portions of the Milwaukee documents might have set out stipulations that were not to the mining company’s liking. Further discussion here.

Read more about the Boundary Waters reversal here.

 

 

 

 

Did Interior Abandon NEPA for Antofagasta?

New documents show top officials at the Department of the Interior planned to review Antofagasta’s mineral leases near the Boundary Waters under the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, before renewing them. That plan appears to have been abandoned after meetings with Chilean mining company executives in spring of 2018.

The latest Boundary Waters documents in response to my FOIA lawsuit come from Daniel Jorjani, who was Deputy Solicitor at the Department of the Interior when these records were created. The release consists of 122 heavily redacted pages, mostly emails and briefings that circulated as the Department of Interior was preparing to announce that it had reinstated Antofagasta’s mineral leases on May 2, 2018.

These records show that the Bureau of Land Management decided against any “proactive” statement (like a press release) on the reinstatement, and opted instead to create an “if-asked” statement for the press. Russell Newell drafted the if-asked statement and Associate Solicitor Karen Hawbecker reviewed and edited it on Monday, April 30. Deputy Solicitor Jorjani approved Hawbecker’s edits at 5:30PM the same day.

Newell’s draft and Hawbecker’s edits of the if-asked statement are both fully redacted, but we know what the if-asked statement said because Dylan Brown, a journalist writing for E & E News, asked.

Lori Mashburn, White House Liaison at the Department of the Interior, included the official response to Brown’s query in her May 4 Daily Update for Cabinet Affairs. The Update went to Jorjani, David Bernhardt, Doug Domenech and other political appointees as well as Russell Newell. 

At the end of April, 2018, the Department understood that the lease renewals would require “review under the National Environmental Policy Act.” That is also the understanding of the law set forward by the plaintiffs in a lawsuit over the lease renewals currently before the US District Court for the District of Columbia: 

The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires that agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of their actions before the actions occur, and that they prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). Courts have clarified that in the mineral leasing context, an agency must prepare an EIS analyzing the ultimate effect of mineral development when it issues a lease without reserving absolute authority to prevent development on the lease. 

But when it came to renewing Antofagasta’s mineral leases, one year later, the Department of the Interior set NEPA aside. Instead of taking a hard look, as required by NEPA, they issued an EA or Environmental Assessment — which is really only a first step in determining whether a project will have significant environmental impact. 

Why the change of plan? As I’ve written here and elsewhere, the Department of the Interior seems to have abandoned plans for an EIS after meetings with executives from Antofagasta in spring of 2018.

In a March 6 meeting summary included with a previous release of documents, Antofagasta officials explicitly stated that an EIS would interfere with their plans. They wanted a Categorical Exclusion; they would settle for an EA. That is exactly what they got.

So it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that top Interior officials knew renewing the leases would require review under NEPA, but they deliberately set aside US law in order to do the bidding of Chilean mining executives.

The August documents are now online here, and all the Boundary Waters documents I’ve obtained to date are here.

Read more about the Boundary Waters reversal here.